This paper characterizes risk preferences both theoretically and empirically in a model with two consumption goods, one of which involves a commitment in that an adjustment cost must be paid when the good is sold. In this environment, risk aversion with respect to moderate-scale shocks is amplified relative to risk aversion over large-scale shocks. In addition, agents have a motive to take certain gambles with large payoffs. Using event studies of consumption behavior around unemployment shocks, we provide evidence that the commitment of homeownership distorts consumption decisions, thereby amplifying the welfare cost of moderate shocks. During unemployment spells, renters reduce both housing and food consumption, whereas homeowners concentrate expenditure reductions primarily on food. However, for unemployment shocks that involve large income losses, homeowners reduce both food and housing expenditure sharply. These results indicate that commitments can explain two puzzles in the standard expected utility model: high moderate-stake risk aversion and lottery playing by insurance buyers. The model has implications for a broad set of issues including optimal social insurance policies and portfolio choice. *
Many households have "consumption commitments" that are costly to adjust when shocks such as job loss or illness occur. For example, most homeowners do not move during unemployment spells (Gruber 1998) , and effectively have a commitment to make mortgage payments. Commitments extend beyond housing: Warren and Tyagi (2003) find that nearly 70% of the average household's budget is to some extent non-discretionary in the short run (e.g., vehicles, insurance contracts, utilities, educational expenses). In a series of case studies featured in the New York Times, families affected by adverse shocks frequently report difficulties in paying rent, medical expenses, and other bills for pre-committed expenditures. 1 This paper proposes a model of commitments and risk preferences, and tests its empirical relevance using microdata on household behavior. The results suggest that incorporating consumption commitments into the analysis of risk preferences can help explain several stylized facts and yields a number of new normative implications.
The canonical expected utility model of risk preferences does not allow for commitments because it assumes that agents consume a single composite commodity. This assumption requires that agents can substitute freely among consumption goods at all times. When some goods cannot be costlessly adjusted, a composite commodity does not exist, and the standard expected utility model cannot be applied. We study the effect of commitments on risk preferences by building on Grossman and Laroque (1990) , who analyze consumption and asset pricing in a model with a single durable good. We analyze a model in which agents consume two goods -one that is freely adjustable at all times (food), and one that requires payment of a transaction cost to change consumption (housing). The introduction of the second adjustable good facilitates the analysis for reasons described below.
We consider an environment in which agents are subject to wealth shocks (e.g., unemployment or illness) after making a housing commitment. Under weak conditions, agents follow an (S,s) policy over housing: they move if they have a large unexpected gain or loss in wealth, but do not move in the intermediate region. We focus on characterizing the value function over wealth for agents with a commitment, v(W ), which determines the welfare cost of shocks and risk preferences.
In the conventional model without adjustment costs, v(W ) is a concave function. The introduction of commitments affects the shape of v(W ) relative to this benchmark in two ways.
First, commitments amplify risk aversion over moderate stake risks. Within the (S,s) band, the curvature of v(W ) is greater than it would be if the household had no commitments (i.e., if housing 1 See, e.g., New York Times (Nov. 15, 2002 ); Warren and Tyagi also cite several examples (e.g. p53). 1 were freely adjustable). Intuitively, for shocks that do not induce moves, households are forced to concentrate all reductions (or increases) in wealth on changes in food consumption. For example, if a family needs to reduce total expenditure by 10% and has pre-committed half of its income, they are forced to reduce spending on discretionary items such as food by 20%. This forced distortion in the consumption bundle amplifies the curvature of v(W ) within the (S,s) band (as in Figure 1 ), particularly when agents face borrowing constraints that prevent smoothing across periods. For a shock sufficiently large to warrant moving, further reductions in wealth are optimally diversified by cutting both food and housing, and therefore do not generate as high a marginal welfare cost. This restores the curvature of v(W ) to the lower no-commitment level outside the (S,s) band. Hence, commitments amplify the welfare cost of small, temporary shocks such as unemployment relative to the welfare costs of larger shocks such as long-term illness.
The second effect of commitments on risk preferences is to generate a motive to take certain gambles. The gambling motive arises from non-concavities in v(W ) at the edges of the (S,s) band: the marginal utility of wealth at S − ε is lower than the marginal utility of wealth at S + ε. As a result, committed agents may take bets that have big payoffs. Intuitively, an agent with a housing commitment who earns an extra dollar can spend it only on food; but buying a lottery ticket gives him an opportunity to "buy the dream" of owning a bigger house, which can have higher expected utility than just another dollar of food.
These two properties of v(W ) suggest that commitments can help resolve two basic puzzles that arise in expected utility theory. The first is that plausible degrees of risk aversion over large stakes imply minimal risk aversion over moderate-stake risks in the standard expected utility model (Hansson 1988, Kandel and Stambaugh 1991, Rabin 2000 ). Yet introspection and empirical evidence suggest that moderate-stake risk aversion is quite high in practice. For instance, the demand for non-catastrophic insurance coverage (e.g., health or auto insurance) and social insurance programs that insure shocks such as unemployment or injury can only be rationalized with high degrees of risk aversion (see e.g., Gruber 1997) . The second puzzle is that individuals buy some types of insurance yet also buy lottery tickets. Friedman and Savage (1948) proposed a non-concave utility over wealth to explain lottery playing. 2 Commitments can be interpreted as microfoundations for a non-concave utility over wealth in a model with standard diminishing marginal utility preferences.
The primary mechanism through which commitments affect risk preferences is by forcing households to deviate from ideal unconstrained consumption plans for moderate-scale shocks. We test the strength of this mechanism empirically using panel data on unemployment shocks and food and housing consumption from the PSID. We focus on two predictions derived from the model. The first is that individuals who have high adjustment costs for housing should concentrate more of their expenditure reduction on food when they become unemployed relative to individuals with low adjustment costs, who should adjust both food and housing. To test this, we compare consumption growth rates of renters and homeowners in a ten-year window around the date of unemployment using a non-parametric event-study methodology. As predicted, renters (who have lower moving costs) reduce both food and housing consumption almost equally when unemployed, whereas homeowners reduce food consumption much more sharply than housing (see Figure 3 ).
The second testable implication is that the distortion in the food-housing consumption bundle should be smaller for large shocks that push homeowners out of the (S,s) band than for small shocks. This is the mechanism that amplifies the welfare cost of moderate stake shocks relative to large, move-inducing shocks. We test this prediction by dividing unemployment shocks into two groups on the basis of the total wage loss associated with the shock. For large shocks (total wage loss greater than 33% of previous annual wage), homeowners reduce food consumption immediately and housing consumption with a one-year lag by 15-20%. In contrast, for small shocks, housing consumption remains constant while food consumption falls by 10% (see . Housing commitments therefore amplify the welfare cost of moderate-scale shocks, but not large shocks, as the model predicts. All of these findings are robust to controls and several specification checks.
A natural concern with our empirical methodology is that households are not randomly allocated into the homeowner and renter or small and large shock groups, potentially creating selection and omitted variable biases in our estimates. While we cannot definitively rule out such concerns, we argue in the course of our empirical analysis that the full set of results are difficult to explain with alternative stories. Based on a simple calibration, the empirical estimates imply that commitments amplify moderate-stake risk aversion by at least a factor of 3 relative to the benchmark case without adjustment costs. The substantial effect of commitments on the welfare cost of moderate-scale shocks has implications for several issues, which we describe in the conclusion.
Our model is related to several papers in the literature on consumption and durable goods, starting with the seminal work of Grossman and Laroque (1990) . Our analysis extends this work in two ways. First, because Grossman and Laroque study a continuous time model with a smooth diffusion process for wealth, they do not explore how risk preferences vary with the size of the gamble. We show that commitments induce substantial differences between risk aversion over small and large shocks. Second, by introducing an adjustable good, we show that commitments affect risk preferences by changing the sensitivity of adjustable consumption to shocks. This observation permits us to derive and implement transparent empirical tests of the commitments mechanism using panel data on adjustable consumption.
Our analysis is also related to studies that apply adjustment cost models to understand macroeconomic consumption behavior (e.g., Bertola and Caballero 1990, Caballero 1993). More recently, Flavin and Nakagawa (2003) analyze asset pricing in a two-good adjustment cost model, and find that it fits consumption data better than neoclassical models. Several recent studies have also explored the implications of two-good commitments models in other contexts, including Fratantoni We would like to emphasize some limitations of our analysis before proceeding. Though our model can explain risk aversion over moderate risks such as unemployment, it cannot explain "first-order" risk aversion with respect to very small gambles (e.g., $10-$100 stakes). Explaining such behavior requires a kink in the utility function, as in models of reference-dependence and loss aversion (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky 1979, Koszegi and Rabin 2005 ). The commitments model is not inconsistent with loss aversion, and quantifying the relative contribution of the two models over various stakes would be an interesting direction for future research. More generally, further empirical work with more detailed consumption data and structural estimation of preference parameters is needed to obtain a full characterization of the risk preferences induced by various types of commitments.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section develops a model of commitments, characterizes risk preferences, and derives testable predictions. Section 2 describes the estimation strategy and data, and section 3 gives the empirical results. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of the model. All proofs are given in the appendix. 4 1 Theory
Setup
The leading example of a good involving a commitment is owning a house. Changing consumption of housing typically entails moving expenses and large transaction costs. Broker fees are around 5% of a home's listing price, and leaving a neighborhood could have additional costs such as having to change schools for children. More generally, any durable good (e.g., vehicles, furniture) involves some commitment, as market resale values are significantly lower than actual values. Finally, a number of services involve explicit contracts and penalties for early termination -examples include personal health insurance, health clubs, cellular phones, and cable television. 3 As Table 1 shows, goods involving commitments comprise a significant portion of most households' budgets. 4 To explore the effects of such commitments on risk preferences, consider a household that lives for T periods and consumes two goods: adjustables, such as food (f ), and commitments, such as housing (x). Adjusting commitment consumption that provides x units of services per period requires payment of an adjustment cost k · x where k > 0. 5 The household's problem is to choose a consumption path to maximize the expected value of lifetime utility:
where period utility u(f, x) is strictly increasing in both arguments, strictly concave, and twice differentiable.
The household has a risky income stream denoted by y t . Let W t denote wealth at the beginning of period t. The change in wealth, W t+1 − W t , is determined by income minus expenditure on current food and housing consumption, less moving costs kx t−1 in the event that the household 3 Late payments do not eliminate commitments. In the event of an income shock, the individual must still eventually pay the bill. The ability to make late payments is simply an additional credit channel. 4 At least the first five categories in Table 1 could involve commitments. As the fraction of committed expenditures is not crucial for the theoretical analysis, we leave the precise definition open to interpretation. 5 We do not model the reason that agents choose to consume goods such as housing by making the commitment of homeownership rather than opting for more flexible arrangements such as renting. In the case of housing, Glaeser and Shapiro (2002) argue that the agency problems associated with renting create strong incentives for homeownership. Moral hazard problems could also explain why it is often beneficial to purchase rather than rent cars, appliances, and furniture. See Postlewaite, Samuelson, and Silverman (2005) for a more formal analysis of why agents choose to make commitments. decides to move. Normalizing the interest rate to zero, the household's dynamic budget constraint is therefore
The timing of the household's problem is as follows. In period zero, the household purchases a house x 0 to maximize expected utility given initial income y 0 and its knowledge of the the distribution of the future path of income. The household begins consuming f and x in period 1, which it enters with wealth y 0 and prior commitments x 0 . In period 1 and all subsequent periods, consumption of f t and x t is chosen to maximize expected utility, taking into account the cost of adjusting prior commitments.
We make two substantive assumptions to simplify the analysis of the household's problem.
First, we abstract from capital market imperfections by allowing the household to borrow against future income. Second, we assume that all uncertainty in the economy is resolved in period 1:
in particular, the household learns the entire realization of {y t } T t=1 on that date. We discuss the implications of relaxing these assumptions below.
Consumption Behavior
The optimal consumption policy in period 1 is governed by two state variables: prior commitments x 0 and lifetime wealth W = y 0 + P T t=1 y t . Following the realization of W in period 1, there is no subsequent uncertainty, which implies that the optimal consumption plan for all future periods is deterministic. Since the discount factor and interest rate are zero, the household sets flat consumption paths to maximize utility: f t = f 1 and x t = x 1 for all t = 1, 2..., T . As a result, if the household ever moves, it moves in period 1.
The decision to move in period 1 depends on a trade-off between the benefit of having the optimal bundle of food and housing consumption and the transaction cost required to reach that bundle. To characterize this decision formally, let v c (W, x 0 ) denote the household's value function in period 1. Then
where v 0 (W, x 0 ) is maximized utility conditional on never moving, and v m (W, x 0 ) is the maximized utility of a household who moves in period 1. The optimal choice of the household has a simple 6 analytical solution if the utility function satisfies the following weak conditions.
for all x.
A2
The marginal utility of food is nondecreasing in housing consumption:
Both of these conditions are satisfied for a wide class of utility functions, including (1) the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) specification as long as the elasticity of substitution is not greater than 1; and (2) separable power utility over the two goods as long as the coefficient of relative risk aversion for food is 1 or higher. Under these conditions, the agent's consumption policy in period 1 can be written as an (S,s) rule similar to that in Grossman and Laroque (1990) .
Lemma 1 Under assumptions A1 and A2, for each x 0 > 0 there exist s < S such that (i) when W ∈ (s, S), the optimal policy is not to move:
(ii) when W / ∈ (s, S), the optimal policy is to move, and
(iii) when k increases, s falls and S increases.
The intuition underlying this result is straightforward. Suppose the agent experiences a large negative wealth shock in period 1. Then he will be forced to reduce food consumption drastically in order to maintain the housing commitment that he previously made. Since such a sharp reduction in food consumption causes a large reduction in utility, it becomes optimal to pay the adjustment cost and move into a smaller home. Conversely, if wealth rises sharply, rather than allocating all of his extra wealth to food, whose marginal utility eventually diminishes to zero, he decides to pay an adjustment cost and fully reoptimize his consumption bundle by upgrading to a large house. For smaller shocks, the utility gain from reoptimizing the consumption bundle is insufficient to offset the transaction cost, so there is an (S,s) band where the agent does not move.
Assumptions A1 and A2 are useful in obtaining the (S,s) result because they guarantee that the agent moves for large shocks. A1 ensures that the household will find it optimal to move to a smaller house rather than cut food consumption to zero. To understand the role of A2, consider the case where f and x are perfect substitutes. In that case, A2 is violated, and the household would never move, because housing and food are completely interchangeable.
Empirical evidence confirms that agents do follow (S,s) policies over the consumption of illiquid goods that involve fixed adjustment costs (Eberly (1994) , Attanasio (2000) , Martin (2003) ). In addition, in our empirical analysis below, we show that homeowners move when they face unemployment shocks that lead to large income losses, but not when they face small unemployment shocks. Hence, violations of assumptions A1 or A2, if any, do not appear to be large enough to cause deviations from the intuitive (S,s) policy in practice.
Risk Preferences
The welfare cost of shocks, and thus the household's risk preferences, are determined by the shape of the value function v(W, x 0 ) in period 1. We formally characterize this function in a series of steps.
Before proceeding, it is helpful to introduce some notation. Let γ n (W ) represent the coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA) over wealth for a hypothetical agent who pays no adjustment costs for food or housing. Let γ c (W ) represent the analogous parameter for an agent with commitments. 6 Let γ f = −u 11 f u 1 (f, x) represent the CRRA over food, and define ε u f ,x = u 12 x u 1
as the elasticity of u 1 (f, x) with respect to x. Note that both γ f and ε u f ,x are pure preference parameters: they depend on the level of f and x only, and not on the presence or absence of adjustment costs.
Let f n (W ) and x n (W ) represent the optimal consumption choices as a function of wealth in period 1 for a consumer who faces no adjustment costs. Let ε n f,W denote the elasticity of food consumption with respect to wealth W in period 1 for this consumer, and let ε c f,W be the corresponding elasticity in the presence of adjustment costs. Define the wealth elasticities of housing ε n x,W and ε c x,W analogously. Effect of commitments on CRRA. Consider first the benchmark case of a consumer who faces no adjustment costs. This consumer's CRRA over wealth in period 1 is
The intuition for this expression is as follows. Utility maximization requires that the marginal utility of wealth equals the marginal utility of food at the optimum; that is, v n W = u 1 (f n , x n ). Hence, the change in v W from a 1% increase in W is reflected by the change in u f . The marginal utility of food itself changes for two reasons: first, because increased food consumption reduces u 1 and second, because increased housing consumption can affect u 1 because of complementarity between the two goods.
For a consumer with adjustment costs, a similar calculation gives
as long as W ∈ (s, S). There is no term involving the elasticity of x here because within the (S, s)
band, housing does not change with W .
In general, the terms in (2) and (3) are not directly comparable, because γ f is evaluated at different values of (f, x) in the two cases. However, at the wealth level W 0 where the optimal choice of x with no adjustment costs is x n (W 0 ) = x 0 , the consumption bundles are the same irrespective of the level of adjustment costs. As this point, we can compute an exact value for the change in risk aversion due to commitments:
Equation (4) captures the key intuition of our model. It shows that commitments magnify risk aversion for two reasons, corresponding to the two non-negative terms on the right hand side. The first term arises from the fact that wealth shocks are borne solely on the food margin when housing consumption is fixed. Thus, a 1% reduction in wealth requires a reduction of more than 1% in food consumption, creating a larger increase in marginal utility than would occur without commitments, when housing could also be cut. More concretely, consider an individual who loses his job and cuts 9 back sharply on food or clothing expenditures to pay the mortgage and other bills. The welfare cost of unemployment is larger for this individual because he cannot reduce commitment consumption easily, forcing him to concentrate reductions on a few goods.
The second term in (4) shows that commitments magnify risk aversion further in the presence of complementarity (u 12 > 0). Without adjustment costs, the optimal response to a reduction in wealth is to reduce both x and f . When u 12 > 0 the reduction in x reduces the marginal utility of f , cushioning the effect of the cut in f on marginal utility. When x cannot be adjusted, this cushioning effect is shut down, and a given drop in f has a larger impact on marginal utility. More concretely, suppose the adjustable and commitment goods are electricity and housing. A given reduction in electricity (used for heating) has a larger cost in terms of marginal utility when the agent cannot simultaneously reduce housing consumption, magnifying risk aversion.
Curvature of the value function. The amplified risk aversion result in (4) can be extended to all wealth levels in the (s, S) band by imposing restrictions on the how the curvature of u(f, x) varies over a range of consumption bundles. In particular, we assume that the utility function satisfies one of the following conditions.
is homogenous of some degree 1 − γ.
These assumptions allow for most common specifications of preferences over two goods, including CES utility and separable preferences with different power utilities over f and x, as long as risk aversion is lower over x than over f . The following proposition characterizes the curvature of v(W, x 0 ) at all wealth levels.
Proposition 1 Assume that A1 and A2 hold. Then, (i) when either A3 or A4 holds, commitments magnify risk aversion:
(ii) when either A3 or A4 holds, risk aversion is higher inside the (s, S) band than outside: for all W ∈ (s, S) and
(iii) agents have a gambling motive: v c (W, x 0 ) is locally convex at W = s and at W = S, so the one-sided derivatives satisfy
The results of this proposition are illustrated in Figure 1a , which plots the value functions v c (W, x 0 ) and v n (W ). Part (i) establishes that commitments increase the curvature of the value function at all W ∈ (s, S). Part (ii) of the proposition shows that a consumer with commitments is more risk averse inside the (S, s) band than outside. This follows directly from (i), because outside the (S, s) band the consumer has abandoned prior commitments and thus has preferences similar to those of a consumer who faces no adjustment costs.
Part (iii) shows that commitments create an incentive to take some types of zero expectedvalue gambles in period 1 because of the non-convexities in the value function at s and S. Agents only pursue gambles with large payoffs; fair gambles that have payoffs within the (s, S) band are rejected. To see why commitments can generate a desire to take large-payoff gambles, consider an individual who is deciding whether to buy a candy bar that costs $1 or a fair lottery ticket for $1 that will pay $1 million if he wins. A one good (no commitments) model assumes that the agent will buy one million candy bars if he wins the lottery (or one million units of the composite commodity). In this case, buying the lottery ticket is not optimal because the marginal utility of candy is diminishing, and the agent would be better off getting one candy bar with certainty.
However, with commitments, the agent will buy more than just candy if he wins the lottery. While the $1 he has in hand cannot be spent to buy a better house or car, the $1 million dollars can.
Borrowing constraints and persistent uncertainty. We now explore the implications of relaxing some of the restrictive assumptions made above. First consider the effect of borrowing constraints.
Suppose the consumer can never borrow, but has access to a savings technology. To simplify further, assume that the income profile is flat starting in period 2, i.e., y 2 = y 3 = ... = y T = y. This implies that the borrowing constraint will not bind in periods 2 through T ; however, it may bind in period 1 if the realization of y 1 is low enough. Figure 1b illustrates the effect of the borrowing constraint on v(W, x 0 ). For high wealth realizations, the borrowing constraint has no effect on the value function, because the consumer does not want to borrow. However, once wealth falls below the point W BC , at which y 1 = y − y 0 , the inability to borrow forces the consumer to concentrate additional reductions in expenditure 11 solely on period 1 food consumption, instead of smoothing the reduction over T periods. The value function therefore has a kink at W BC : the left hand side derivative is higher than the right hand side derivative by a factor of T .
For low wealth realizations (below W BC ), borrowing constraints further augment the degree to which commitments amplify risk aversion. To see this, assume that γ f is constant or decreasing in f and suppose the household does not find it optimal to move. 7 In this case, if W < W BC , the curvature of the value function is given by
Equation (5) shows that the difference in the CRRA between the commitment and no-commitment cases is further amplified by at least a factor of T if the agent faces a binding borrowing constraint.
Intuitively, agents without borrowing constraints can spread temporary shocks over many periods, leading to small changes in marginal utility regardless of whether they have commitments. But if a borrowing constraint binds, the household is forced to cut back on discretionary consumption sharply in that period, and the potential welfare gain from relaxing a pre-commitment becomes much greater.
We now briefly discuss what happens when the consumer faces additional risk in future periods.
Note that (2) and (3) remain valid expressions for the CRRA in this case. However, the key elasticity ε c f,W responsible for magnified risk aversion may be reduced. This is because future risk provides additional margins (in the form of future commitment consumption) that the consumer can adjust in response to a shock. For example, suppose there is a high probability of a moveinducing shock in period 2. In this case, commitments have little impact on risk aversion in period 1, because future commitment consumption is effectively adjustable, and only current commitments are not adjusted in response to the shock.
While the commitment effect is reduced with future uncertainty, one can show that at wealth level W 0 , risk aversion continues to be magnified relative to the no adjustment cost benchmark.
Moreover, with borrowing constraints, the possibility of future adjustment becomes less relevant, and risk aversion could still be substantially amplified by commitments. These points indicate that the importance of commitments for risk aversion is ultimately an empirical question. 8 
Welfare costs of non-negligible risks
Our analysis thus far has focused on the characterizing the shape of the value function by analyzing the coefficient of relative risk aversion, which measures preferences over infinitesimal risks. In practice, most risks of interest (such as job loss) are not infinitesimal, and it is therefore important to understand the implications of commitments for the welfare costs of such risks. This analysis is also useful for deriving testable predictions because the unemployment shocks we examine in our empirical analysis are non-negligible.
To model non-negligible risks, let f W represent a random variable which equals the wealth realization in period 1. Let E f W denote the mean of f W . The welfare cost of this risk can be measured by the proportional risk premium π( f W , x 0 , k) for a consumer with prior commitments x 0 and adjustment costs k. The risk premium π is defined such that at the beginning of period 1, the household is indifferent between f W and a sure payment of E f W ·
In order to compare risk aversion over gambles of different sizes, it is convenient to normalize π by a measure of the size of the risk. To do so, consider the family of lognormally distributed random variables f W with a fixed mean E f W ∈ (s, S). For each such f W , define the risk of f W as
. A natural measure of the risk premium per unit of risk is then
This measure of the risk premium is convenient because for a utility function that exhibits constant relative risk aversion γ, the per-unit risk premium satisfies γ(σ 2 ) = γ regardless of the shock size σ 2 . 9 This result obtains because the shocks under consideration are all lognormally distributed; however, one could construct analogous measures for other families of random variables as well. 8 In addition, factors omitted from the model, such as the ability to postpone small durable purchases (Browning and Crossley 2004) or the ability to reduce maintenance expenditures for housing may reduce the bite of commitments. 9 For vanishingly small risks, γ(σ 2 f W , x 0 , k) is equal to the CRRA at the wealth level E f W by the Arrow-Pratt approximation. Hence, this measure of the risk premium per unit of risk is sometimes used to motivate the definition of the coefficient of relative risk aversion. See Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995) for details.
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Our objective is to examine how commitments affect the welfare cost (measured by the perunit risk premium) for moderate-scale and large-scale risks. 10 We define f W to be a "moderate shock" with respect to k and x 0 if its expected value and certainty equivalent satisfy E f W ∈ (s, S)
and W CE ( f W , x 0 , k) ∈ (s, S). In words, f W is a moderate shock if neither its mean nor certainty equivalent induces the household to move.
Proposition 2 Assume that A1 and A2 hold. Then, (i) Adjustment costs magnify moderate-stake risk aversion: For any moderate shock f W with respect to k 1 and x 0 , and any
(ii) When either A3 or A4 holds, the per-unit risk premium is greater for small shocks than
This proposition formalizes the main results of the paper: Consumption commitments magnify the welfare cost of moderate risks (shocks that usually do not induce households to abandon commitments) relative to large risks. Part (i) shows that the risk premium demanded for moderate shocks is greater for households that are more committed in the sense of having higher adjustment costs for housing. The second part of the proposition shows that households with commitments require greater compensation per unit of risk for small shocks than they do for large shocks. Hence, small shocks such as temporary unemployment may be more costly relative to their magnitude than large shocks such as longer-term job displacement.
These results are illustrated in Figure 2 , which plots γ(.) as a function of risk size (σ 2 ) for two households with different adjustment costs. Consistent with the proposition, the figure shows that the per-unit risk premium is high for small risks, but asymptotes to a low level as the size of risk increases. In contrast, for a consumer with power utility and no commitments, the per-unit risk premium is flat because it does not vary with the size of the risk. The figure also shows that the consumer who faces higher adjustment costs is generally more risk averse, consistent with the first part of the proposition.
The mechanism underlying these results is that commitments force households to deviate from ideal unconstrained consumption plans for moderate-scale shocks. To see how this more precisely, 10 In this exercise, we vary the distribution of f W while holding x 0 fixed. This is consistent with x 0 being endogenously chosen if the consumer learns about the true distribution of f W after x 0 is set. In that case, the consumer has a prior over possible distributions f W at date zero.
14 take a log-linear approximation to the change in marginal utility in response to a wealth shock ∆ log W to obtain:
This equation, which is an extension of (2) for non-negligible risks, says that the effect of a shock on the marginal utility of wealth is determined by (1) the curvature of utility over food times the size of the food drop associated with the shock; and (2) the elasticity ε u f ,x times the size of the housing drop, which captures the "cushioning effect" due to complementarity. Note that the first term in (6) is always negative while the second term is always non-negative. The two results in Proposition 2 follow directly from this equation:
1. Households with high adjustment costs move infrequently in response to moderate-scale shocks. They therefore cut food sharply but housing very little on average ( large ∆ log f ∆ log W and small ∆ log x ∆ log W ) when hit by a negative shock. This makes the first term in (6) large and the second term small, leading to a large increase in marginal utility. Households with lower adjustment costs reduce both x and f , making the first term smaller in magnitude and the second term larger in (6), dampening the effect of the shock on marginal utility. The welfare cost of the shock is greater for households with high adjustment costs because they are forced to deviate further from the ideal unconstrained combination of f and x.
2. Large shocks induce more households to move than small shocks. Agents with a housing commitment who experience small negative shocks therefore cut food sharply but housing very little on average (small ∆ log x ∆ log W and large ∆ log f ∆ log W ), while those who experience larger shocks reduce both f and x. Again because of the more distorted consumption response, the welfare cost of a small shock is greater relative to its magnitude than the welfare cost of a large shock.
These two points indicate that the extent to which commitments distort consumption bundles directly determines the extent to which they affect risk preferences. Therefore, a natural way to test the empirical relevance of the model is to ask, "Do commitments force households to deviate from ideal consumption bundles substantially when hit by moderate shocks in practice?" We turn to this question in the next section.
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2 Empirical Analysis
Estimation Strategy
We test the mechanism underlying the two results on commitments and non-negligible risks using data on households' consumption responses to shocks. We estimate the following equation on various groups:
where c is either f (food) or x (housing), ∆ log W is an unanticipated wealth shock, i indexes individuals, and ν i,g is an error term. In this equation, g denotes a group of households. Suppose first that there are two groups of households who experience moderate shocks: those who have high adjustment costs for housing (g = H) and those who have low adjustment costs for changing housing (g = R). Following the logic described in the previous section, the mechanism underlying the part (i) of Proposition 2 yields our first testable hypothesis:
Now consider a different grouping among households that all have high adjustment costs: a set that experience small shocks (g = S) and a set that experience large shocks (g = L). The mechanism underlying part (ii) of Proposition 2 yields our second testable hypothesis:
The ideal way to test H1 and H2 would be an experiment in which households are randomly allocated to two groups with different adjustment cost levels, or to two groups that are subject to shocks of different sizes. Lacking such an experiment, we test the two predictions using observational data on consumption responses to unemployment shocks in various groups of households.
To test H1, we examine the effects of unemployment on food and housing consumption for renters and homeowners. Homeowners typically have higher adjustment costs for housing because of the cost of selling a property. Consistent with this intuition, 36% percent of renters in our sample move per year, whereas only 10% of homeowners move per year. H1 predicts that homeowners should reduce food consumption sharply but housing consumption by very little when unemployed, while renters should reduce both. To test H2, we classify unemployment shocks into "small" and "large" groups on the basis on the wage income loss associated with the shock. H2 predicts that homeowners who experience a long unemployment duration with a large wage loss should behave like renters in that they cut both food and housing consumption to accommodate this large shock.
Since we rely on observational data, we must make some identification assumptions to estimate the β coefficients. Within each group, the estimated β coefficients will measure the impact of a wealth shock on consumption if (a) unemployment is an unanticipated event and (b) unemployment affects consumption only because of reduced income, and not complementarity between consumption and labor supply. These assumptions are supported by existing studies of consumption smoothing during unemployment spells, such as Gruber (1997) and Browning and Crossley (2001) . These studies demonstrate that consumption of food falls by approximately 8-10% on average when agents become unemployed, and that increases in unemployment benefits reduce the size of the consumption drop (particularly for low asset households). Gruber's estimates imply that with sufficiently high unemployment benefits, there would be no consumption drop associated with unemployment, suggesting that borrowing constraints (and not complementarity) drive the consumption drops. 11 Moreover, in our own empirical analysis, we find that consumption is stable in the years prior to job loss, and that larger shocks lead to larger consumption drops. These results justify the assumption that unemployment spells are unanticipated wealth shocks, implying that we can obtain unbiased estimates of the β coefficients within each of the four groups (homeowners, renters, small shock, and big shock).
To test H1 and H2, we compare the consumption responses to unemployment across the groups, and attribute the differences in behavior to commitment effects. A natural concern with this empirical strategy is that the groups being compared differ in many respects aside from adjustment costs and size of shocks. For example, homeowners are on average wealthier and more educated than renters; moreover, because of their wealth and ability to smooth intertemporally, homeowners are likely to experience a smaller proportional wealth shock during unemployment. Fortunately, our empirical analysis does not require that homeowners and renters be identical along such dimensions, 11 A different line of evidence suggesting that complementarity effects are not central is given by Aguiar and Hurst (2005). They explicitly compute measures of "consumption" and "expenditure" while unemployed and conclude that the reduction in expenditure while unemployed is indeed a reduction in consumption, unlike the drop in expenditure at retirement. because we compare the composition of the expenditure reductions (food vs housing) and not the levels. To test H1, we only require that if homeowners were to face the same adjustment costs as renters, they would behave like renters in the sense that they would cut both f and x. If this assumption holds, evidence that homeowners cut only f while renters reduce both f and x would allow us to conclude that homeowners' adjustment costs generate distorted consumption responses.
In the course of describing the empirical results, we discuss several pieces of evidence -such as comparisons of pre-unemployment trends and the inclusion of various controls -which suggest that the results are not spuriously generated by differences in preferences across the groups.
Before proceeding, it may be helpful to clarify the purpose of testing H1 and H2. As described above, there are various reasons that the consumption distortion (and resulting amplification of risk aversion) due to commitments could be small. By testing H1 and H2, we can answer the basic question of whether commitments have a first-order effect on the welfare cost of real risks such as unemployment. However, these tests do not shed light on whether commitments affect ex-ante risk attitudes, i.e., whether agents make insurance purchases or portfolio choices differently when they have more commitments. These questions have been examined in other recent empirical studies 
Data
We use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics spanning 1968 to 2003. The PSID tracks approximately 6,000 households and their splitoffs over time, and is the primary source of longitudinal data on consumption in the US. The key variables for our tests are employment status, food consumption, and housing consumption. We follow Zeldes (1989) and Gruber (1997) in defining these variables. We define an individual as "unemployed" if he reports working at the time of the previous interview and searching for a job at the time of the current interview. We define food consumption as the sum of household consumption at home, away, and paid for by food stamps. We measure housing consumption as annual rent payments for renters, and home value for homeowners. Since we only examine growth rates of consumption, it is not critical to translate the home values into measures of flow housing consumption except for cases where individuals switch from owning to renting or vice versa. In our baseline analysis, we omit these "switchers" for simplicity. We then show that including these switchers by computing the rental value of owning a house using a user cost series or computing differences between mortgage payments and rent does not affect the results.
The food, rent, and home value data are deflated using food and housing price deflators from the CPI to obtain real growth rates. Although the consumption data are reported at an annual frequency, the framing of the consumption questions refers to the point of the interview. As pointed out by Zeldes and Gruber, this justifies the use of these variables as measures of consumption during the time of the interview rather than measures of total consumption over the past year.
We make three restrictions on the raw data to obtain the core sample used in the empirical analysis. First, we include only observations for household heads who are between the age of 20 and 65. Second, we exclude observations where there was a change in the number of people in the household, to avoid biases in total consumption measures due to changes in the size of a household unit. Finally, to facilitate event studies of unemployment shocks, we only include individuals who report becoming unemployed once during the sample period. 12 There are some years when food and housing data were not collected (e.g., 1973-1975 and 1988-89) , requiring us to omit these observations from the analysis.
These exclusions leave 1,869 unemployment spells (each of which corresponds to a different individual) and a total of 25,726 observations in the core sample. Table 2 More than 20 years of data are available for the average individual, permitting a long event-study of behavior around unemployment shocks.
Empirical Results

Graphical Event-Study Analysis
We begin by providing graphical evidence on the effect of unemployment shocks on consumption patterns to test the two hypotheses. We then show the robustness of these results to controls, sample selection, and other potential specification concerns using a set of regressions.
We construct event-study graphs by normalizing the year of unemployment as 0 for all indi-viduals, and define all other years relative to this base year (e.g., the year before the shock is -1, the year after the shock is +1). We examine consumption behavior in a ten year window around the unemployment shock by computing real annual growth rates for each of the consumption measures. For example, for an individual who lost his job in 1990, the growth rate in year -4 refers to consumption growth from 1985 to 1986. We compare the mean growth rates of food and housing in each year from -4 to +5 for various subsets of the data to test the hypotheses of interest.
We first test the adjustment cost hypothesis (H1) by comparing the consumption responses of renters and homeowners to unemployment. Figures 3a-b supports the prediction that commitments force agents to concentrate consumption responses to shocks on adjustable goods. In particular, the fact that homeowners cut food consumption but not housing indicates that the welfare cost of unemployment is larger than it would be in the absence of housing commitments. 13 Since food consumption drops substantially for homeowners, we can reject the alternative hypothesis that the welfare costs of housing commitments are circumvented by intertemporal smoothing or other channels.
The evidence in
Figures 4 and 5 examine hypothesis 2 regarding small vs. large shocks. These figures include only homeowners, the group that appears to face a binding housing commitment. We classify an 13 Note that the magnitude of the food consumption drop is not much larger for homeowners than renters. This is consistent with the fact that homeowners are wealthier and thus experience a smaller shock (smaller ∆ log W ). Hence, the implication is not that the welfare cost of unemployment is greater for homeowners than renters. Rather, it is that the cost of unemployment for homeowners is larger than it would be if they could adjust housing as easily as renters, holding all else fixed. unemployment shock as a "large" shock if the total wage loss due to unemployment exceeds 33%, i.e. total wage income in year 0 is at least 33% less than total wage income in year -1. This would occur, e.g., if an individual had an unemployment spell that lasted for more than 17 weeks and found a new job that paid the same wage as the old one. 14 The remaining unemployment spells are classified as "small" shocks. By this classification, approximately 1/3 of the unemployment spells are large shocks. Figure 4a shows that food consumption falls by 8% in year 0 for homeowners who experienced small unemployment shocks. In contrast, housing consumption remains roughly constant in the years around the unemployment spell for this group. Figure 4b shows that food consumption falls by 15% on average in year 0 for individuals who experience large wage losses due to unemployment, confirming that the shocks in this group are indeed larger than in the small shock sample. In this group, housing consumption growth is -4% in year 0 and -10% in year 1. Hence, homeowners adjust housing consumption downward quite sharply after a large unemployment shock, but much of the adjustment occurs with a one-year lag. This suggests that homeowners diversify the impact of large shocks by cutting both food and housing consumption over a two-year horizon.
To investigate the food and housing consumption responses over a two-year horizon more directly, Figure 5 plots two-year growth rates of these variables. In these figures, the growth rate for food consumption in year 1 equals the change in log food consumption from year -1 to year 1. Figure 5a shows that for small shocks, food consumption falls by nearly 10% from the year before the unemployment spell to the year after the unemployment spell, whereas housing consumption is roughly constant. The null hypothesis that both food and housing fall by equal percentages is rejected with p = 0.02. Figure 5b shows that for large shocks, the consumption response is significantly different. From the year before job loss to the year after job loss, food consumption falls by 20% and housing consumption falls by 15%. In this case, the null hypothesis that the reduction in housing and food is equal is not rejected (p = 0.58).
The evidence in Figures 4 and 5 supports the hypothesis that commitments amplify the welfare cost of moderate scale shocks, but not large shocks. In particular, once a shock is sufficiently large, homeowners no longer choose to bear the cost of reducing food sharply, and mitigate the welfare cost of the shock by re-optimizing over both food and housing consumption. 14 Other definitions of "large shocks" (e.g. wage loss <25% or <15%) yield qualitatively similar results. 21 
Regression Estimates
We evaluate the robustness of the graphical results by running a set of regressions that correspond to (7), augmented with controls. In the interest of making limited functional form assumptions, we estimate separate equations for each group (e.g., homeowners and renters), effectively permitting all the parameters of the estimating equation to vary across the groups. The primary estimating equation for the analysis thus has the following form:
where g t = log(c t ) − log(c t−1 ) denotes the growth rate of a consumption measure (food or housing), unemp it = 1 iff individual i is unemployed in year t, and X it denotes a set of covariates. Interactions of the X it covariates with the unemployment shock are permitted to control for differences in the effect of the shock across individuals with different characteristics. For example, homeowners tend to be older and could therefore respond differently to a shock than renters, who are younger on average. The specification with controls addresses this concern by effectively reporting estimates of β for homeowners and renters of the same age. The covariates are de-meaned by subtracting the sample mean (X), so that the coefficient β can always be interpreted as the effect of unemployment on consumption growth for an individual who has the mean characteristics of the sample in terms of observables. Standard errors are clustered by household to allow for potential serial correlation in consumption growth rates, e.g. due to measurement error. Table 3 reports several estimates of β using variants of (10) that give evidence on the first test comparing homeowners and renters. The first two columns of the table give results on food and housing growth for individuals who were renters prior to job loss (β f R and β x R in (8)), while columns three and four report analogous estimates for those who were homeowners in year -1 (β f H and β x H in (9)). Each row reports an estimate of β for the relevant dependent variable and subgroup for a different specification of (10).
In the first row, we replicate the simple graphical analysis by estimating (10) without any controls (no X). Not surprisingly, the estimates confirm the graphical analysis. Renters cut food consumption by 7.3% and housing consumption by 8.6%, whereas homeowners cut food by 9.4% and housing by a (statistically insignificant) 1.8%. The second row adds several covariates to the specification: age, marital status, education, number of people in household, and lagged annual wage income. The estimates from this specification are quite similar to those in row 1. Renters with observable characteristics reflective of the sample mean cut both food and housing by 8-10% on average when unemployed, whereas homeowners with the same observables cut food significantly and housing very little.
The estimates of β in the first two specifications are identified using both the "between" variation that compares growth rates across individuals who are unemployed and employed and the "within" variation that examines how growth rates for a particular individual change when unemployment occurs. To address concerns that the between variation may be contaminated by differences in unobservables across individuals, specification 3 introduces individual fixed effects in the growth rates, which isolates the within variation. The coefficients remain similar, supporting the claim that the coefficients give unbiased estimates of the causal effect of unemployment on consumption patterns.
The fourth specification takes an alternative, less parametric approach to address concerns about differences between homeowners and renters. As noted above, wealthy homeowners may be able to cut on food expenditure significantly without suffering much of a welfare cost (e.g., by visiting restaurants less frequently or buying less caviar). Individuals with high food expenditures might ideally cut primarily food expenditure, even if housing were freely adjustable. The observed drop in food but not housing for homeowners thus might not be evidence of distorted behavior due to housing commitments. To address this concern, we eliminate all individuals who report average annual food consumption per household member above the 75th percentile ($3,758) and replicate specification (1). The results remain very similar for this lower-food group, suggesting that the reductions in food expenditure and not housing are indeed evidence of distorted behavior.
The graphical analysis and preceding specifications discard observations where households switch between owning and renting because the growth rate of housing consumption is difficult to measure in these cases. In specification 5, we investigate whether this selective omission biases the results by bringing these observations into the analysis. To do so, we compute the rental value of a house using a user cost series developed by Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai (2005), which gives user costs for 46 MSAs over 25 years. We compute an "annual rent" for homeowners by multiplying reported home value by the user cost for the corresponding state/year pair. We then compute the growth rate of housing consumption as the change in rent for all observations in the sample. Row 5 reports estimates analogous to those in row 1 with this alternate definition of 23 housing consumption growth using the full sample. The estimates are roughly similar, indicating that the results are not sensitive to the treatment of the ownership-rent switchers.
Finally, we investigate robustness of the results to outliers in consumption growth. We replicate the baseline specification (1) after winsorizing the consumption growth data by recoding food growth rates in the top 1% of the distribution to the 99th percentile of the food growth distribution, which equals 1.37. Similarly, food growth rates in the bottom 1% are recoded to the 1st percentile of the distribution, −1.32. Housing growth rates are winsorized analogously. As shown in row 6, the estimates do not change significantly when the outliers are trimmed. 15 Hence, the β estimates in all six specifications support hypothesis 1. Table 4 repeats this robustness analysis for the second test comparing the effects of small vs.
large shocks for homeowners. Since the graphical evidence suggests that two-year growth rates are most informative in capturing the full adjustment of housing and food to large unemployment shocks, we use two-year growth rates of the relevant consumption measure as the dependent variables in Table 4 . Correspondingly, we include only observations in two-year intervals centered around the unemployment window (years -3, -1, +1, +3, etc.)
The first specification in Table 4 , which does not have any controls, confirms the visual finding that food drops by approximately 9% for "small" unemployment shocks. while housing growth is close to zero. In contrast, for large shocks, both food and housing drop by about 17-20% over the two year period following job loss. The remaining rows of the table show that these results are robust to the inclusion of controls and other specification checks as in Table 3 . Hence, hypothesis 2 is also supported by all of the specifications.
The results in Tables 3 and 4 In summary, the empirical evidence documented above strongly supports the commitments model, provided that the identification assumptions about comparability across groups are valid.
While we cannot prove the validity of these assumptions, there are several reasons to believe that the results are not spuriously generated by differences in preferences. First, there is no obvious ex-ante reason that the difference in the growth of food and housing consumption during unemployment should vary across the four groups as observed. Second, the consumption growth rates are similar across the groups prior to the unemployment event, supporting the claim that these groups are comparable on these dimensions. Third, the fact that controlling for observed heterogeneity in various ways does not affect the results suggests that the estimates are not likely to be very sensitive to unobservable heterogeneity across the groups either. Finally, the finding that homeowners behave similarly to renters for large shocks supports the assumption that the composition of expenditure reductions would be similar in these groups absent differences in the adjustment costs of housing.
How much is risk aversion amplified?
The empirical estimates of the β coefficients can be used to obtain a rough numerical estimate of the extent to which commitments amplify moderate-scale risk aversion. Consider the case with separable utility over food and housing:
Using (2), the ratio of curvatures over wealth with and without adjustment costs is
Intuitively, when the curvatures over food and housing are equal, amplification depends only on the ratio of commitment to food consumption. When commitments constitute a higher share of expenditures, shocks are concentrated on a smaller food margin, and risk aversion is higher. When γ f > γ x , the consumer is particularly risk averse over adjustable goods, amplifying risk aversion further.
To obtain an estimate of (11), note that the optimal choice of a consumer who is free to adjust on both margins satisfies
In this two good model, f should be interpreted as a composite commodity representing all noncommitment consumption and x represents all commitment consumption. A difficulty in computing γ c γ n using our empirical evidence is that we examine only housing commitments and therefore do not have direct evidence on how consumers behave when they can freely adjust all commitment goods (e.g. vehicle, insurance contracts, furniture, etc.). We therefore assume that curvature of utility over housing is representative of the curvature over all commitment goods, and that curvature over food is representative of the curvature over adjustables. Under this assumption, the point estimates in the first row of Table 3 imply
−7.39% = 1.17 if renters can freely adjust on both food and housing when hit by an unemployment shock. To compute x f , note that Warren and Tyagi (2003) report a commitment share of 70%; a more conservative estimate based on the categories in Table   1 is a 50% commitment share (housing, vehicles, utilities, health, and education). When The true amplification effect of commitments may be larger than our calculation suggests for two reasons. First, our estimate of γ f /γ x assumes that renters face no adjustment costs in housing.
Insofar as moving between rented apartments involves some adjustment costs, our estimate of
is a lower bound for the true γ f /γ x . Second, the calculations above ignore borrowing constraints, which presumably bind for many unemployed individuals given the observed consumption patterns. As shown in equation (5), borrowing constraints magnify risk aversion with respect to temporary shocks further beyond the pure commitment effect by a factor related to the intertemporal smoothing horizon of the agent.
Implications of Commitments
When agents have consumption commitments, risk aversion is context-specific, and in particular can vary substantially with the scale of the risk. For shocks that are relatively small or short-lived, the welfare cost of risk is large because agents with commitments concentrate shocks on a few margins such as food. However, for shocks that are very large, there is more flexibility to adjust behavior on many margins, and risk aversion is lower. Individuals can be risk seeking in certain ranges because commitments induce non-concavities in utility over wealth. Empirical evidence indicates that housing commitments force households to concentrate moderate-scale shocks on easily adjustable goods such as food, supporting the mechanism that links commitments and the welfare cost of shocks.
We conclude by speculating on some stylized facts and normative issues where the commitments framework could be of relevance:
1. [Moderate-Stake Risk Aversion] The commitments model generates high moderate-stake risk aversion without requiring excessive large-stake risk aversion, escaping Rabin's (2000) critique of expected utility. Commitments can therefore rationalize purchases of insurance against relatively "small" shocks such as automobile or non-catastrophic health insurance.
[Social Insurance]
Commitments can change the optimal design of large-scale social insurance policies significantly. Calibrations based on the standard one-good expected utility model suggest that the optimal benefit rate for unemployment insurance is close to zero (Gruber 1997 ). When commitments are taken into account, the benefit rate may be substantially higher because of amplified risk aversion (Chetty 2003) . 16 However, the optimal benefit rate for long-term shocks such as disability may be much lower, insofar as all types of consumption get adjusted in the long run. (1968) showed that the optimal punishment strategy to deter crime by risk averse agents is to combine large fines with a low probability of punishment.
In practice, however, firms devote extensive resources to enforcement and do not impose extremely harsh penalties (see Dickens et. al. (1989) , who label this a "monitoring puzzle").
With commitments, employees may be more reluctant to steal or shirk if they face a high probability of apprehension with a moderate fine than a severe but improbable punishment.
[Wage Rigidities]
Committed individuals may prefer a gamble in which they get fired with a small probability rather than take a reduction in wages with certainty, explaining workers' disdain for small wage cuts as discussed in Bewley (1999) Spouses enter the labor force when primary earners become unemployed. Yet the income elasticity of labor supply is small in the long run. Commitments can rationalize this behavior by making the marginal welfare gain from consumption due to added labor supply greater in the short run than in the long run. In the short run, spouses may enter the labor force to help pay the mortgage and other bills; in the long run, these commitments can be adjusted and there is less pressure to change work patterns.
10.
[Taxation] Studies of the labor supply response to taxation generally find small tax elasticities 28 for households with incomes below $100,000 (see e.g., Gruber and Saez (2000) . The inability to fully reoptimize consumption in the short run may dampen responses to tax reforms even if taxes are highly distortionary in the long run. In the short run, households may be reluctant to cut labor supply in response to a tax increase if they have made prior commitments. 
FIGURE 1A EFFECT OF COMMITMENTS ON VALUE FUNCTION
NOTE-This figure shows the value function of a consumer with consumption commitments (heavy line). The adjustment cost makes it optimal not to move as long as W  s, S. Outside the s, S band moving is optimal, because maximized utility when the consumer does not adjust (dotted line) is below maximized utility with adjustment. The presence of commitments increases curvature and magnifies risk aversion inside the s, S band relative to a consumer with no adjustment costs (thin line). The value functions were constructed for the period utility function uf, x  f 1 f /1   f   x 1x /1   x  with  f  4,  x  2 and   0. 1, with a time horizon T  5 and adjustment cost k  0. 2. These parameters were chosen to make the impact of commitments visually clear, and may not necessarily match household preferences, borrowing constraints, or adjustment costs.
FIGURE 1B COMMITMENTS AND BORROWING CONSTRAINTS
NOTE-This figure shows the value function of a consumer with consumption commitments and borrowing constraints (dotted line). For high wealth realizations, utility is identical to that of a consumer with no borrowing constraints (thin line). For low wealth realizations utility falls sharply relative to the benchmark with no borrowing constraints, because the consumer is unable to smooth the impact of a shock intertemporally. The preferences and other parameters used in constructing this figure are the same as those used in the construction of Figure 1a . Table 2 for definition of core sample. For each group, p values are reported for tests of the null hypothesis that the growth rates of food and housing have the same mean within that group in year 0. Table 2 for definition of core sample. Table 2 for definition of core sample. For each group, p values are reported for tests of the null hypothesis that the two-year growth rates of food and housing have the same mean within that group in year 1.
